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Abstract
I present a tractable dynamic model of political economy where disagreements about the
composition of public spending result in implementation of short-sighted policies. The relative
price of investment to consumption is excessively large in equilibrium due to over-taxation.
Investment rates are too low which slows down growth along the transition. In the long run,
this results in output, consumption and welfare being ineﬃciently low. The larger is the
degree of polarization, the greater is the ineﬃciency. Political stability mitigates the eﬀects
of polarization by making the incumbent internalize the dynamic ineﬃciencies introduced by
the choice of growth-retarding policies.
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1 Introduction
One of main driving forces of growth and development is private investment. However, we
see large distortions in the price of investment relative to consumption across countries, cap-
turing barriers to investment (examples are capital income taxes, investment taxes, permits,
etc). These, by distorting investment decisions, slow down growth and result in lower levels of
consumption and income per capita. 1
A key observation is that the price of investment is correlated with socio-political vari-
ables reﬂecting frictions in the government’s decision-making process, such as the degree of
polarization and the level of political instability. Figure 1 shows that for a cross-section of
countries—excluding non-democracies—greater polarization results in larger barriers to invest-
ment (right panel), while this is mitigated by the degree of political stability (left panel).2 These
socio-political variables are also found to be related to the size of governments and economic
development, as discussed in further detail in the next subsection. In this paper, I present a
tractable dynamic model of political economy that explains such relationships.
Figure 1: Price of investment and socio-political variables.
The analysis herein assumes that the role of the government is to provide public goods,
which are ﬁnanced via investment taxes. There are two groups or regions in the economy, and
while agents agree on the size of governments, they disagree over the composition of expendi-
ture. The intensity of such disagreements is captured by the degree of polarization. Groups are
represented by parties which alternate in power via a democratic process, and election outcomes
are uncertain. The degree of political stability (i.e. frequency of turnover) is determined in a
voting equilibrium. The private sector is modeled as a standard neoclassical economy. Individu-
als work for and rent capital to competitive ﬁrms, and consume private and public goods. They
are forward looking and vote for the party that yields them higher expected utility.
There is no commitment technology, so promises made during the campaign are not credible
unless they are optimal ex-post (i.e. when the party takes power). I characterize time-consistent
outcomes as symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria.3 First, I derive the incumbent’s optimality
1Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) show some support of this hypothesis by constructing a panel for the price
of aggregate investment over consumption and documenting that the relative price of investment is negatively
correlated with investment rates.
2Price of investment (1980s average) from Restuccia and Urrutia (2001). Political Stability (1980s average)
from the PRS data set; the variable name is ‘Government Stability’. Polarization is obtained from Lindqvist and
Ostling (2007) who deﬁne a measure of polarization from survey responses about the role of the government.
Dictatorships are excluded from the datasets using the Gastil scale, taken from Easterly and Levine (1997). Both
variables have been normalized to belong to the interval [0,1].
3Thus, the equilibrium described herein is a “fundamental” equilibrium capturing the eﬀects that are inherent
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condition for a general case, as well as characterize the determinants of political turnover in
the equilibrium of a voting model. Second, I solve for this equilibrium in closed form and
derive testable implications from the theory. Third, I compute the economy for a more general
parameterized case.
I ﬁnd that societies that are very polarized tend to grow at a lower rate and converge to
lower levels of income per capita in the long run. The model hence provides a rationality-based
explanation of the empirical relationship found by Easterly and Levine (1997) and others be-
tween polarization (ethnic diversity) and growth. Due to political uncertainty, governments are
endogenously short-sighted—at least more so than the groups they represent. As a consequence,
they tend to overspend, and since public spending is ﬁnanced through distortionary taxation,
there is under-investment and lower levels of income per capita in the long run. Moreover,
the speed of convergence decreases, implying that measured growth rates are lower along the
transition path. This dynamic ineﬃciency is mitigated by the degree of incumbency advan-
tage, which increases political stability. This result is consistent with the negative correlation
between political instability and private investment found for example, in Barro (1991), and
Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel (1996). The stronger is the advantage of the incumbent
over the opposition, the higher is the investment rate, and the faster is the growth to a better
steady state. This stability, however, comes at a cost: the persistence of one government leads
to persistent underspending on public goods of the type preferred by the group out of power.
The degree of ineﬃciencies caused by political failures is characterized in the analytical example,
where the solution is shown to be Pareto-inferior to that in the second best (for any arbitrary
set of Pareto-weights), as long as the outcome of elections is uncertain.
The main intuition behind the results is best understood from the Euler equation faced by
the incumbent in power, which is composed of four terms, each involving a source of ineﬃciency
arising from socio-political frictions. The ﬁrst term captures the trade-oﬀs faced by a government
that lacks commitment and only has access to distortionary taxation in an homogeneous society.
It contains a weighted sum of wedges to (i) private investment and (ii) the marginal utility of
private and public consumption, and is analogous to the optimality condition derived in previous
literature (see, for example, Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull, 2008). It implies that governments
with no commitment choose larger taxes, as the detrimental eﬀect of current taxes on previous
investment is ignored by the incumbent in power. The second term captures the extra distortion
generated by heterogeneity in society—but abstracting from political instability—: the party in
power does not internalize the eﬀects of its policy on the group out of power and this implies an
extra wedge relative to the optimality condition of a benevolent planner. This term is usually
present in environments with a common pool problem, and generally results in over-spending
and over-taxation. The third term summarizes the eﬀect of political instability: the government
wants to decrease the level of resources available to next period’s policymaker (increasing taxes
today) so as to restrict spending on local public goods that his group does not value. This
distortion is common in models with political uncertainty, such as Alesina and Tabellini (1990)
for the case of government indebtedness in a two period model. This last eﬀect might be counter-
balanced by the fourth term, as long as the current incumbent expects to re-gain power sometime
in the future. Larger taxes today have a negative eﬀect in the opposition’s policy that will deter
future investment, and this must be taken into account by the current policymaker. This eﬀect
only appears in inﬁnite-horizon economies with incumbency advantage and has not been derived
in other papers in the literature. It implies a weighted sum of the previous distortions into the
in the dynamic game itself, whether of ﬁnite-or inﬁnite-horizon. The equilibrium here is thus the limit of ﬁnite-
horizon equilibria: its characteristics do not signiﬁcantly depend on the time horizon, so long as the time horizon
is long enough. See Dixit, Grossman, and Gul (2000) for eﬃcient allocation rules that are not Markov in the
political game.
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future, and it is particularly relevant for long-run outcomes.
A discussion of the empirical motivation can be found below, followed by a description of this
work relative to the existing literature. The model is described the Section 2. The political game
and the Markov-perfect equilibrium are deﬁned in Section 3. The incumbent’s Euler equation is
characterized in Section 3.2 under the extra assumption of diﬀerentiability. Analytical solutions
for are presented in section 3.3, where qualitative testable implications are derived. Section 3.4
computes the model for a more general parameterization. Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Empirical motivation
Easterly and Levine (1997) documented that heterogeneity, measured by an index of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, has a direct negative eﬀect on the level of income per capita and
economic growth. This study triggered a large empirical literature on the relationship between
socio-political variables and economic outcomes. While polarization and fractionalization were
used interchangeably in many studies, subsequent work has tried to distinguish these two con-
cepts.4For example Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) provide new
measures of ethnic, linguistic, and religious polarization. They redo the experiments of Easterly
and Levine (1997) and ﬁnd that polarization leads to lower GDP per capita and negatively af-
fects growth rates. Lindqvist and Ostling (2007) use responses of a survey about economic policy
to derive an alternative measure of polarization and ﬁnd that politically polarized countries are
poorer. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) ﬁnd that while ethnic fractionalization signiﬁcantly
reduces growth, ethnic polarization does not. They ﬁnd instead that ethnic polarization has a
large and negative impact on economic development through the reduction of investment and
the increase of government consumption, which indirectly aﬀect growth. Hall and Jones (1999)
ﬁnd that the more homogeneously a country is Catholic or Muslim, the higher is their output per
worker. his paper develops a formal political economy model that provides micro-foundations for
the empirical relationships between ethnic (and cultural) diversity and economic development.
Consistently with the empirical facts, it predicts that polarization is negatively correlated with
income per capita, investment and growth rates, and output per worker, while it is positively
related to the size of governments.
The model also provides a micro-foundation for some of the ﬁndings relating political instabil-
ity and growth. The empirical link between institutions and economic development in ethnically
polarized societies was ﬁrst pointed out in a systematic way by Barro (1991). He ﬁnds that
political instability, measured as assassinations per million population and coups/revolutions
per year, has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on growth from 1960 to 1985 for a panel of coun-
tries. He also ﬁnds a strong negative correlation between the size of governments (measured
by public consumption) and private investment. Asteriou, Economides, Philippopoulus, and
Price (2000) ﬁnd that increases in the probability of re-election (measured by the popularity of
the government) increase growth in the UK. Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel (1996) study
a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950-1982 and ﬁnd that increases in political insta-
bility signiﬁcantly reduce growth. Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) relate the post-1973 patterns
of public-sector spending as a share of GDP in the OECD countries to the characteristics of
their political institutions. Devereux and Wen (1998) also provide empirical support for the bias
towards spending. They show that sociopolitical instability (using the Barro and Lee index) has
a positive eﬀect on the ratio of government spending to GDP. The model’s predictions are also
consistent with these correlations.
4See Esteban and Ray (1994). Fractionalization measures often capture just the number of diﬀerent groups in
society but not the intensity of disagreement. Polarization is more closely related to the distance between two or
more groups, and their relative population shares in society.
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A main point in this paper is that the conﬂict arising in polarized societies results in gov-
ernments choosing ineﬃcient policies that slow down growth. Our hypothesis is that the larger
the degree of polarization, the higher the barriers to investment, which reduces the incentives
to invest. 5 Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) provide support for the link between large investment
distortions and low investment rates, which result in low growth rates. Our contribution over
their work is to introduce a link between socio-political variables and investment distortions, as
shown in Figure 1. 6
Since both variables are highly correlated (their correlation is -0.51), it is interesting to
decompose their eﬀect on the relative price of investment. A simple OLS regression presented
in Table 1 reveals that polarization and political stability are signiﬁcant.7
Table 1: Dependent variable : relative price of investment
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Intercept 0.515 (0.641) -1.777 (1.865)
Polarization 9.532** (3.383) 25.816* (12.896)
Political stability -0.763* (0.394) 2.982 (2.890)
Polar.*Polit. stability -27.204 (20.802)
R2 0.368 0.394
F-stat 12.226** 13.322**
To understand this, consider a one standard deviation (0.02) increase in polarization from
its mean of 0.138. Using the second regression, this implies an increase of 0.18 in the relative
price of investment. Increasing political stability from its 0.65 mean by a s.d. (0.17), results
in a decrease of 0.14 instead. Consistent with these estimates, the model delivers a positive
correlation between the investment distortion and polarization, and a negative relationship with
political stability.
1.2 Literature review
There are a number of papers emphasizing that parties may choose not to implement policies that
increase welfare because their reelection is uncertain. The argument in this literature is that the
government may be less inclined to improve the legal system, to overspend on public goods (which
only beneﬁt a speciﬁc group), to create excessive levels of debt or to under-invest in productive
public capital.8 The contribution of this paper lies in the analysis of a dynamic inﬁnite-horizon
political economy model embedded in a neoclassical environment, where policy aﬀects private
5There are alternative formulations (like the use of income taxes and capital income taxes) which would lead
to similar outcomes to the ones described in this paper.
6Hsieh and Klenow (2007) argue the higher relative price of investment in poor countries is due to lower
eﬃciency in producing investment goods (a productivity puzzle), rather than to distortions in investment. This
is based on the fact that the price of investment has practically no correlation to real GDP per worker, while the
price of consumption is lower in poor countries. While I will be focusing on a closed economy model, the results
presented here would be consistent with their ﬁndings as long as the non-tradeable component of investment
is relatively cheaper in poor countries—since this would oﬀset the eﬀect of a higher tax rate, resulting in the
investment price having a low correlation with income—.
7Interestingly, even when a measure of TFP is included (from Hall and Jones, 1999), both coeﬃcients are still
jointly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but TFP is instigniﬁcant. * denotes signiﬁcance at 5%, and ** at 1%
level.
8Svensson (1998) analyzes the eﬀects on the legal system. Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and
Tabellini (1990) study the interaction between changes in the identity of the policymaker and excessive debt
creation in two period models, while Caballero and Yared (2008) extend these to an inﬁnite horizon model
of taxation smoothing. Besley and Coate (1998) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) present models where the
government under-invests.
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investment and long run outcomes. A forward-looking government must take into account how
future policymakers will react to current changes in investment caused by taxes and how this in
turn will aﬀect the availability of resources if power is regained. This dynamic strategic eﬀect
cannot be captured in two-period models. Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsivynski (2008a), Devereux
and Wen (1998), and Woo (2005) do analyze inﬁnite-horizon models where under-investment
and overspending arise, but mainly because policymakers have diﬀerent preferences (and hence
objectives) than private agents. In the ﬁrst case politicians try to maximize rents from being
in power, and hence are completely self-interested. In the other two cases, parties care only
about public goods but disregard agents’ welfare (that is, they ignore the eﬀects of policy on
private consumption). In a very interesting recent paper, Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsivynski
(2008b) extend these ideas to an environment where policymakers may be benevolent, and the
whole set of sustainable equilibria is characterized (with Pareto weights capturing the strength
of political institutions). One of the main diﬀerences is that they focus on a repeated model
of production where labor is endogenous, but there is no capital investment. This eliminates
dynamic links between policy at diﬀerent points in time (the dynamics in their model arises from
reputation concerns). They also assume that parties alternate in power exogenously, but ﬁnd
that the set of sustainable allocations is independent of political instability. While the study
of sustainable equilibria would be an interesting extension to this paper, it is an open question
whether the positive correlation between investment taxes and political stability would hold in
the best equilibrium.
This paper also contributes to a growing literature on political failures that result from a
fundamental lack of commitment of the government. While existing models with repeated voting
ﬁnd strategic interactions, most of them have to rely on numerical methods to characterize the
Markov-perfect equilibrium, as in Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999), or Azzimonti, de Francisco,
and Krusell (2008). Hassler, Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2004), on the other hand, ﬁnd
analytical solutions in an overlapping generations setup where policy is decided by majority
voting, but assume away political uncertainty. As here, Hassler, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2007)
ﬁnd that expenditures in a consumable public good can be ineﬃcient, but in a model where two-
period lived agents vote over redistributive policy. Unlike in their work, distortionary taxation
deters private investment in this paper, which allows us to analyze the eﬀects of policy on
economic growth during the transition and compare long run outcomes. In a partial equilibrium
model (also without capital), Battaglini and Coate (2008) introduce productive public goods
ﬁnanced by the government. Instead of focusing on political parties, they assume that policy
(i.e. spending on an unproductive public good, pork barrel expenditures, and taxation) is
decided through legislative bargaining. In their work the probability of being able to choose
expenditures is exogenous and only depends on the number of legislators, while it is endogenous
here and depends on future expected policy. Moreover, we focus on the dynamic distortions
caused in private investment by large governments, while they emphasize the eﬀects on the
labor supply and the provision of durable public goods.
This paper also extends existing literature by endogenizing the probabilities of re-election
in a dynamic setup. By allowing agents to vote, the degree of political uncertainty is jointly
determined with public policy. A key assumption in this paper is that politicians do not have
commitment to platforms, but are instead citizen candidates. As a result, the incumbent maxi-
mizes the utility of the group they represent and disregards the welfare of other groups. This is
contrary to standard probabilistic voting with commitment to platforms, where the politician’s
maximization problem is equivalent to that of a benevolent planner without commitment (see
for example Sleet and Yeltekin, 2008 or Farhi and Werning, 2008). Because of the symmetry
assumption, I ﬁnd that the probability of re-election is independent of the stock of capital. See
Lagunoﬀ and Bai (2008) for an interesting reduced form environment based on Battaglini and
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Coate’s (2008) model, where the re-election probability depends on the aggregate state of the
economy in a parametric form by assuming that policy-makers face a Faustian trade-oﬀ.
The model that is most closely related this one is that by Amador (2003), which also analyzes
the ineﬃciencies generated by the common pool problem in a dynamic model. His basic mech-
anism, like the one in this paper, is based on the trade-oﬀs described in Alesina and Tabellini
(1990). Amador analyzes an inﬁnite-horizon economy where politicians also have a bias towards
the present: they are too impatient and behave as hyperbolic consumers. This results in in-
eﬃcient overspending and excessive deﬁcit creation. The contributions over his work are: the
introduction of private investment and distortionary taxation, the endogenous determination of
political turnover, and the link between socio-political variables and economic outcomes. In a
recent paper, Aguiar and Amador (2009) analyze the eﬀects of these two socio-political variables
on expropriation rates, which aﬀect economic growth by deterring investment by multinational
ﬁrms. Their focus is on the ﬂow of capital across countries in open economies, while I analyze the
eﬀects of investment distortions on the domestic market. Methodologically, they characterize
reputation equilibria, while I consider Markov-perfect equilibria.
The model that is closest in terms of the motivation is that by Padro-i-Miquel (2007), which
analyzes the pervasive eﬀects of ethnic diﬀerences in taxation, spending, and development in
a dynamic economy. The main diﬀerence is that policy-makers are partisan and alternate in
power via a democratic process in my paper, while there is no institutionalized succession of
autocrats (whose objective is to maximize rents from power) in Padro’s paper.
2 The basic model
2.1 Economic environment
Consider an inﬁnite-horizon neoclassical economy populated by agents that live in one of two
regions, the north N and the south S, of measure μJ = 12 , J = {N,S}. Agents work in the
production sector for a competitive wage, rent capital to ﬁrms, and enjoy the consumption of
private and public goods. While they have identical income and identical preferences over private
consumption, there is disagreement on the composition of public expenditures due to the fact
that the government can provide local public goods (e.g. parks, museums, local infrastructure
and schooling). Agents are assumed to diﬀer, not only in their preferences over the composition
of expenditures, but also in another dimension that is completely unrelated to economic policy
(religious views, charisma of the politician, etc.). Preferences over this political dimension imply
derived preferences over the policymakers. The instantaneous utility is assumed to be separable
in the consumption of public and private goods, and the political shocks are assumed to be
additive. For agent j in region J we have
(1− ρ)u(cJjt) + ρv(gJt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
economic
+ ξjt︸︷︷︸
ideological
, (1)
where u and v are increasing and concave, with v(0) ≡ v¯, cjt denotes the consumption of private
goods and gJt is the level of discretionary spending on local goods in region J . The variable ξjt
summarizes the utility derived by agent j from political factors (to be described later in more
detail). Notice that an agent living in the north derives no utility from the provision of a good
in the south (and vice versa), so in principle there will be disagreement in the population on the
desired composition of public expenditures, but not on its size, since both types have the same
marginal rate of substitution between private and public goods.
The parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of polarization in
society. If ρ was equal to zero, agents would only derive utility from private consumption and
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there would be no disagreement in the population. As ρ increases, agents put more weight in the
provision of public goods. Since these can be partly targeted to diﬀerent regions, it implies that
agents views will be further away from each other so the society is more polarized. As ρ → 1
the disagreement becomes extreme. This parameter will be the key variable governing the size
of government distortions in cross country comparisons.
Agents ﬁnance private consumption and investment with their capital and labor income.
The government raises revenues by taxing investment at the proportional rate τt. The consti-
tution allows parties to choose diﬀerent spending levels on public goods, but restricts them to
discriminate taxation levels across agents, so agents’ budget constraint is
cjt = wtljt + rtkjt − (1 + τt)ιjt,
where capital evolves according to kj,t+1 = ιt + (1 − δ)kjt, and δ denotes the depreciation rate.
Every agent is endowed with k0 units of initial capital.
Private goods are produced by competitive ﬁrms that have access to a constant returns to
scale technology: yt = F (Kt, Lt), where Lt is aggregate labor and Kt is the stock of capital. The
cost of producing g > 0 units of a local public goods is given by x(g), and x(0) = 0. Assuming
that there is no debt, the government must balance its budget every period, so its constraint
reads as: 9 ∑
J
x(gJt ) = τtιt.
The proceeds from taxation are displayed in the right hand side of the equation, while the left
hand side contains the sum of expenditures in local public goods.
Deﬁnition 1: A competitive equilibrium given public spending {gNt , gSt }∞t=0 is a sequence of
allocations, {cjt, ljt, kj,t+1, ιjt,Kt+1, Lt}∞t=0, tax rates {τt}∞ and prices {wt, rt}∞t=0 such
that: (i) Agents maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, (ii) ﬁrms maximize
proﬁts, so wt = F2(Kt, Lt) and rt = F1(Kt, Lt), (iii) markets clear
∑
J μ
JkJ,t+1 = Kt+1,∑
J μ
J lJt = Lt, and (iv) the government budget constraint is satisﬁed.
Aggregate consumption and investment will be denoted by ct and ιt respectively. In this
economy, prices and aggregates determined in a competitive equilibrium are independent of
region speciﬁc characteristics as shown next.
Equivalence: consider two CE with a diﬀerent composition of local public goods s.t. their
per-period aggregate cost x(gNt )+x(gSt ) is unchanged ⇒ the sequences of {c,Kt+1, ιt, τt} in
the two equilibria are identical.
To see this, notice that since leisure is not valued, the supply for labor is inelastic ( lt = 1).10
Agents’ saving decisions satisfy
(1 + τt)uc(cjt) = β[rt+1 + (1− δ)(1 + τt+1)]uc(cj,t+1).
Because of the separability between private and public consumption assumed in the utility
function, investment is aﬀected only by the tax rate, and is independent on the type of public
9I abstract from debt, since the application of this model is mainly for developing economies. Under lack of
commitment, these have a high probability of defaulting. It would be interesting to introduce debt with a default
choice to this environment, but it is beyond the scope of this paper, and hence left for future research.
10The model can be easily extended to include an endogenous labor decision. Since this would involve more
notation and no signiﬁcant changes in the main results, I decided not to include the extension in this version of
the paper.
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good being provided. Since the government taxes both regions at the same rate, their citizens
save the same amount (recall that k0 is the same in all regions) and regional investment is
identical to the overall country investment. This implies that individual and average capital
holdings coincide, kj,t+1 = Kt+1. The level of consumption is, as a result, also identical across
regions. Prices and aggregate allocations are independent of the distribution of types, and we
can think of the outcomes of the competitive equilibrium as resulting from a representative
agent.
We can then drop the superscript j for individual allocations and write the government
budget constraint as ∑
J
x(gJt ) = τt[Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt].
The current government decides on the level of taxation and expenditures in each type of
public good, taking as given private investment. In what follows, I will make use of the following
function, which will simplify notation signiﬁcantly,
T (K,K ′, g) = x(g
N ) + x(gS)
K ′ − (1− δ)K . (2)
where g = {gN , gS} denotes the composition of spending.
2.2 A planning problem
Before describing the outcome under political competition (where diﬀerent parties alternate
in power), it is useful to characterize the optimal allocations chosen by a benevolent social
planner. The planner takes the initial level of capital K0 as given, and chooses the sequence
{ct,Kt, gNt , gSt }∞t=0 that maximizes the weighted sum of utilities, where the weight on type J
agents is given by λJ (with λN + λS = 1). Its maximization problem follows.
max
∑
J
λJ
∞∑
t=0
βt[(1 − ρ)u(ct) + ρv(gJt )], (3)
subject to the resource constraint, with f(Kt) ≡ F (Kt, 1),∑
J
x(gJt ) + ct + Kt+1 = f(Kt) + (1− δ)Kt.
As long as the planner gives a positive weight to each agent, the optimal allocation of public
good J will be such that its marginal utility is proportional to the marginal utility of private
consumption.11
(1− ρ)uc(ct)xg(gJt ) = λJρvg(gJt ) (4)
By varying λj between 0 and 1 it is possible to trace the Pareto frontier that characterizes the
optimal provision of public goods. Concavity of u implies that if type S agents have a higher
weight in the social welfare function, more of their desired public good will be provided (at the
expense of type N agents).
The optimal investment choice satisﬁes
uc(ct) = βuc(ct+1)[fk(Kt+1) + 1− δ] (5)
11It is important to note that the planner is constrained to oﬀer all households the same consumption allocation
(that is, cNt = c
S
t , ∀t). This is imposed in order to capture the constraint faced by the government in the political
equilibrium (where parties cannot tax agents at diﬀerent rates). If the planner only cares about the well-being
of, say, agent N , it will set gSt = 0∀t and gNt so as to equate the marginal rate of substitution between private
and public goods to 1.
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Hence, the planner chooses Kt+1 to equate the marginal costs in terms of foregone consumption
to the discounted marginal beneﬁts of the investment. Departures from these two equations
deﬁne gaps or wedges from optimal allocations. As they will be used in the following sections,
we deﬁne
Δgt ≡ −(1− ρ)uc(ct)xg(gJt ) + λJρvg(gJt )
and
Δkt ≡ (1− ρ)[−uc(ct) + βuc(ct+1)[fk(Kt+1) + 1− δ]].
3 The political game
The role of the government in this economy is to provide public goods. Given the disagreement
between groups over which public good should be provided, political parties will endogenously
arise in a democratic environment. I analyze a stylized case where there are two parties, N and
S, representing each region in the population and competing for oﬃce every period.
There are two key features that distinguish political parties from a benevolent social planner.
The ﬁrst one is that parties only care about the well-being of their constituency, rather than
trying to maximize the welfare of the whole population.12 The second one is that politicians
lack a commitment technology. This has implications in two dimensions. Firstly, investment
taxes introduce a source of time-inconsistency in the government’s problem even in the absence
of political uncertainty, so the second best cannot be achieved (see Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull,
2008 for a description). Secondly, because promises made over the campaign are non-binding.
This implies that political competition does not induce politicians to maximize a utilitarian
welfare function (as in the traditional Lindbeck-Weibull model, studied more recently in Sleet
and Yeltekin, 2008 or Farhi and Wening, 2008), but rather the utility of the party in power.
We can divide each period t into two stages: the Taxation Stage and the Election Stage. At
the Taxation Stage, an incumbent from group i chooses τ, gN , and gS knowing the state of the
economy (K) and the distribution of the political shocks but not their realized values. Hence,
policy is chosen under uncertainty: with some probability the incumbent will be replaced by
a candidate from a diﬀerent party. After production, consumption and investment take place,
ξ′ is realized. The probability of re-election can be calculated by forecasting how agents would
make their voting decisions for diﬀerent realizations of the shock.
At the Election Stage, agents vote for the party that gives them higher expected lifetime
utility. They need to forecast how the winner of the election would choose policy. The assump-
tions of rationality and perfect foresight imply that their predictions are correct in equilibrium.
Next section, we will solve the problem backwards.
3.1 Markov-perfect equilibrium
There is no commitment technology, so promises made by any party before elections are not
credible. The party in power plays a game against the opposition taking their policy as given.
Alternative realizations of history (deﬁned by the sequence of policies up to time t) may result
in diﬀerent current policies. In principle, this dynamic game allows for multiple subgame-perfect
equilibria, that can be constructed using reputation mechanisms. I will rule out such mechanisms
and focus instead on Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE), deﬁned as a set of strategies that depend
12In that sense this is a partisan model. A politician from party J is just like any other agent in that group.
In contrast, other models in the literature assume that politicians can extract rents from being in power, so their
objective is to maximize the probability of winning the next election. See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a
discussion on opportunistic models.
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only on the current—payoﬀ relevant—state of the economy. The equilibrium characterized here
corresponds to the limit of the ﬁnite horizon game. 13
Given the sequence of events, and the separability between the economic and political di-
mensions, the only payoﬀ-relevant state variable for the government is the stock of capital, K.
The equilibrium objects we are interested in are: the spending rule in good J followed by in-
cumbent i, GJi (K), its probability of re-election pi = pi(K), and the rule governing the evolution
of aggregate capital under i’s policies, K ′ = Hi(K), where primes denote next period variables.
We will start the analysis from the Taxation Stage where an elected incumbent chooses policy,
and then move to describe the election process, as well as the determination of probabilities of
re-election.
Election Stage
The utility derived from political factors, ξ, has three components: an individual ideology
bias (denoted by ϕj), an overall popularity bias (ψ) and an incumbency advantage term (χ). In
particular, 14
ξj =
(
ψ + ϕj
)
Ii + χ I˜i,i− ,
where I and I˜ are indicator functions such that IN = 1 and IS = 0, Ii,i = 1 and Ii,i− = 0, if
i = i−. The subindex i denotes the identity of the party in power, and i− represents last period’s
value of i. The individual speciﬁc parameter ϕj measures voter j ’s ideological bias towards the
candidate from party N. Its distribution is assumed uniform ϕj 
[
− 12φ , 12φ
]
.15
These shocks are iid over time, hence ‘candidate speciﬁc.’ Each period, a given party presents
a candidate and voters form expectations about the candidate’s position on certain moral, ethnic
or religious issues, orthogonal to the provision of public goods. Examples are attitudes towards
crime (gun control or capital punishment), drugs (i.e. whether to legalize the use of marijuana),
immigration policies, abortion, etc. A value of zero indicates neutrality in terms of the ideological
bias, so agents only care about the economic policy, while a positive value indicates that agent
j prefers party N over S. Individuals belonging to the same group may vote diﬀerently.
The parameter ψ represents a general bias towards party N at each point in time, measuring
the average relative popularity of candidates from that party relative to those from party S.16
It captures candidates’ personal characteristics such as honesty, leadership, integrity, charisma,
trustworthiness, etc. Candidates with higher values of ψ are preferable. The popularity shock
is iid over time and distributed according to ψ 
[− 12Ψ , 12Ψ].
As noted in the empirical literature, the party in power is more likely to win an election.
Among the reasons, it has been argued that the public is familiar with the incumbent. This cre-
ates an incumbency advantage, which in the model is captured by the parameter χ. Everything
else equal, voters prefer an incumbent over a challenger when χ > 0.
13In a recent paper, Bhaskar, Mailath and Morris (2009) showed that for a set of perfect information games
with sequential move, as long as players have bounded memory (i.e. their strategies do not depend on the inﬁnite
past) and the equilibrium is putriﬁable (i.e. robust to small perturbations in agents payoﬀs), all equilibria are
Markovian. Their setup, however, does not include a dynamic state variable.
14I build on the speciﬁcation presented in Persson and Tabellini (2000). Note that I am abusing notation since
ξ does not only depend on i, but also on i− and j.
15This is a usual assumption in the literature. See Persson and Tabellini (2000).
16Political scientists refer to this parameter as valence, referring to “issues on which parties or leaders are
diﬀerentiated not by what they advocate but by the degree to which they are linked in the public’s mind with
conditions or goals or symbols of which almost everyone approves or disapproves”(Stokes, 1992).
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At the election stage, voters compare their lifetime utility under the alternative parties. The
maximization problem of voter j in group S is given by
max
{
VS(K ′, i) , WS(K ′, i) + ψ′ + ϕj′,
}
;
where VS(K ′, i) = VS(K ′g) + χ I˜S,i and WS(K ′, i) = WS(K ′) + χ I˜N,i. If the incumbent today
belongs to the same party (so INN = 1 and INS = 0) then there is some extra utility associated
with the incumbency advantage eﬀect. The maximization problem of an agent in group N is
analogously deﬁned.
Determination of probabilities
Let us turn now to the intermediate stage between taxation and voting. The shocks have
not yet been realized and we are trying to determine the probability of re-election that each
party will face. Individual j ∈ S votes for N whenever the shocks are such that VS(K ′, i) <
WS(K ′g, i) + ψ′ + ϕj′. We can identify the swing voter in group S as the voter whose value of
ϕj′ makes him indiﬀerent between the two parties
ϕSi (K
′) = VS(K ′, i) −WS(K ′, i)− ψ′.
All voters in group S with ϕj′ > ϕJi (K
′) also prefer party N .
The same type of analysis can be performed for agents in group N, so there is a swing voter
in each group. The value of ϕJi depends on the diﬀerence in utilities of having group S vs. group
N being in oﬃce, on the realization of the popularity shock, and on the identity of the party in
power at the time of elections. The share of votes for party N is:
πiN =
∑
J
μJP
(
ϕj′ > ϕJi (K
′)
)
=
1
2
[1− φ
∑
J
ϕJi (K
′)].
Under majority voting, party N wins if it can obtain more than half of the electorate; that is,
if πiN > 12 . This occurs whenever its relative popularity is high enough. There exists a threshold
for the ψ, denoted by ψ∗i (K
′) such that N wins for any realization ψ > ψ∗i (K
′). After performing
some algebra using the expression above, we ﬁnd that
ψ∗i (K
′) = VS(K ′, i)−WS(K ′, i) + WN (K ′, i) − VN (K ′, i), (6)
The threshold is given by a weighted sum of the diﬀerences in the utility of the swing voter
under each party, and it is a function of the stock of capital.
Since ϕJi (K
′) depends on the realized value of ψ, πiN is a random variable. If N was currently
in power, its probability of re-election would be given by pN (K ′) = P (ψ′ > ψ∗N (K
′)), which is
equivalent to:
pN (K ′) =
1
2
− ψ∗N (K ′)Ψ. (7)
S’s probability of re-election is
pS(K ′) =
1
2
+ ψ∗S(K
′)Ψ. (8)
The current level of consumption in public goods does not aﬀect the voting decision (i.e.
no retrospective voting). Voters do not ‘punish’ politicians/parties for their past behavior but
decide instead in terms of their future policy choices.
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Taxation Stage
At this stage, the incumbent must decide on the optimal spending level g, knowing that it
will be replaced by a diﬀerent policymaker with some probability pi(K ′). As standard in the
literature, current governments choose their policy taking into account that future governments
will play according to the Markov-perfect equilibrium rule. See Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull
(2008, KKRR thereafter) for a description of equilibria in a simpler setting (their taxation
problem is similar, but they abstract from political turnover). To ﬁx ideas, consider the problem
faced by the incumbent of type N 17
max
gN ,gS≥0
(1− ρ)u(c) + ρv(gN ) + β{pN (K ′)VN (K ′) + [1− pN (K ′)]WN (K ′)} (9)
where VN denotes the utility of an agent residing in region N when his party is in power and
WN his utility when out of power (to be described later). Consumption follows
c = f(K) + (1− δ)K −
∑
J
x(gJ)−K ′ ≡ C(K,K ′, g),
where g = {gN , gS} and K ′ is the level of tomorrow’s capital, that satisﬁes the agents’ ﬁrst order
condition,
(1 + τ)uc(c) = βEiN
[
[fk(K ′) + (1− δ)(1 + τ ′i)]uc(c′i)
]
, (10)
where τ = C(K,K ′, g), τ ′i = T (K ′,Hi(K ′),Gi(K ′)), and c′i = C(K ′,Hi(K ′),Gi(K ′)). EiN de-
notes the expectation over policies followed by tomorrow’s incumbent, given that party N is
currently in power. Equation (10) deﬁnes a functional equation that determines future capital
as a function of current capital and government spending, K ′ = HN (K, g). This equation de-
termines agents’ optimal reactions to a one-period deviation from the current government of g
from the equilibrium rule that an incumbent of type N would follow, GN (K). Agents know that
a future government of type i plays according to the equilibrium strategy, so g′ = Gi(K ′), where
capital follows K ′′ = Hi(K ′). Consistency implies that Hi(K) = Hi(K,Gi(K)). Agents in all
regions save at the same rate, so Equivalence holds even in the presence of political uncertainty.
It is clear from the problem above that party i sets gJ = 0, J = i. Slightly abusing notation,
we use Gi(K) to denote the equilibrium amount spent by incumbent i on the local public good
i. The description of the problem is completed by deﬁning the functions VN (K) and WN (K):
VN (K) = (1− ρ)u(CN (K)) + ρv(GN (K)) (11)
+β{pN (HN (K))VN (HN (K)) + [1− pN (HN (K))]WN (HN (K))}, and
WN (K) = (1− ρ)u(CS(K)) + ρv¯ + β{pS(HS(K))WN (HS(K)) + [1− pS(HS(K))]VN (HS(K))}
(12)
where Ci(K) ≡ C(K,Hi(K),Gi(K)). Equation (11) represents the value function of a type
N when his group is currently in power while eq.(12) is the utility when out of power, given the
opposition S’s policy decisions. There are two diﬀerences between these functions. The ﬁrst one
is that when the incumbent’s party is out of power, g = 0. The second one is that the expected
utility is diﬀerent, because pN represents the probability of re-election of incumbent type N (so
if the group is currently out of power, it regains power with probability 1− pS).
The political uncertainty, combined with the conﬂict over the provision of public goods,
creates incentives to act strategically. Even though parties represent their constituencies and
17In this formulation, I follow Persson and Tabellini (2000) and assume that parties maximize utility net of
shocks. The qualitative nature of results does not change if shocks are included, but the notation becomes much
more cumbersome.
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have no derived value of being in oﬃce, they will try to manipulate the probability of being
re-elected (which allows them to implement the desired policy in the future). Moreover, by
controlling the level of investment via changes in the tax system, they can indirectly aﬀect
policy decisions of future policymakers by changing the amount of capital available to them.
This can be seen in the last term of the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to g, for incumbent N
−(1− ρ)uc(c)xg(g) + ρvg(g) + HNg(K, g) [−(1− ρ)uc(c) (13)
+β
{
pN (K ′)VNK(K ′) + [1− pN (K ′)]WNK(K ′) + pNK(K ′)[VN (K ′)−WN (K ′)]
}]
= 0,
where pNK(K ′) =
∂pN (K
′)
∂K ′ and K
′ = HN (K, g).
An increase in g has a direct eﬀect on current utility, since it diverts resources from private
to public consumption, as shown in the ﬁrst term. The marginal beneﬁt is given by the increase
in the marginal utility of public goods vg, given by the second term. Notice that the beneﬁt
received by the current group is generally larger than that of a benevolent planner due to the
fact that incumbents have a higher weight on their own group when λN < 1. There is an indirect
eﬀect, as an increase in g is ﬁnanced with distortionary taxes on investment: facing larger taxes,
agents decide to cut on investment. This is captured by the change in K ′ since HNg < 0.
The reduction in K ′ has a contemporaneous eﬀect that raises the marginal utility of current
consumption, but at the expense of aﬀecting future utility. When K ′ decreases, expected future
utility goes down from the contraction of resources. Agents living in region N suﬀer a decrease
of utility of VNK(K ′) =
∂VN (K
′)
∂K ′ if they win the next election (which occurs with probability
pN ) and WNK(K ′) =
∂WN (K
′)
∂K ′ otherwise (which occurs with probability 1 − pN ). Given that
the identity of the decision-maker changes over time, the envelope theorem doesn’t hold in this
environment, so the traditional Euler equation will not be satisﬁed.
Finally, a change in investment today modiﬁes the problem faced by voters, which in turn
aﬀects the probability of re-election. A rational incumbent realizes this and thus takes into
account the eﬀect of the reduction of K ′ on its likelihood of winning. It is reasonable to expect
that VN (K ′) > WN (K ′), a party is better oﬀ while in power. However, the sign of pNK(K ′) is,
in principle, ambiguous.
Politico-economic equilibrium
We can now deﬁne a political equilibrium that takes into account agent’s voting decisions.
Deﬁnition A Markov-perfect equilibrium with endogenous political turnover is a set of value
and policy functions such that:
i. Given the re-election probabilities and government policy, agents maximize utility and
ﬁrms maximize proﬁts: the functions Hi(K), Vi(K), and Wi(K) solve eqns. (10), (11) and
(12) respectively.
ii. Given the re-election probabilities and ﬁrms’ and agents’ optimal decisions, the function
Gi(K), solves incumbent i′s maximization problem, given by eq. (9).
iii. Given the optimal rules of government, agents, and ﬁrms, pN (K) and pS(K) solve eq.
(7) and eq. (8).
We look for a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, where the incumbent chooses the same
aggregate level of spending in public goods regardless of its type gNN = g
S
S ≡ G(K) and faces the
same re-election probability pN (K ′) = pS(K ′) ≡ p(K). This is a natural selection due to the
fact that ideology shocks are symmetric and the economy satisﬁes the ‘equivalence’ property. 18
18The composition of expenditures will of course be diﬀerent, since gNS = and g
S
N = 0.
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It is straightforward to show that if both parties face the same probability of re-election it is
best for them to choose symmetric policy functions. Inspection of eqs.(9), (11), and (12) reveals
that they face exactly the same maximization problem when in power. The value functions
when out of power are also identical. Therefore, they will choose the same taxation levels, which
implies HN (K) = HS(K) ≡ H(K) and C(K) = f(K) + (1 − δ)K − x(G(K)) − H(K). Hence,
the path of taxes and consumption is deterministic.
In general p(K) is a non trivial function of the state variable and requires the use of numerical
methods for its characterization. However, in a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium it is
possible to show that the probability of re-election takes a very simple form: it is a constant. The
probabilities of re-election are given by eqs.(7) and (8). Assume that both parties follow the same
policy rules while in power and guess a constant probability of re-election: pS(K) = pN (K) ≡ p.
Since policy rules are symmetric, VS(K ′, S)− VN (K ′, S) = χ and WN (K ′, S)−WS(K ′, S) = χ.
This implies that ψ∗S(K
′) = χ and ψ∗N (K
′) = −χ. Replacing these into eqs. 7 and 8, we verify
that:
pN (K ′) = pS(K ′) =
1
2
−Ψχ. (14)
Since it is impossible to distinguish between the utility gains from incumbency advantage χ
and the density of popularity shocks Ψ in this model, we will combine both in the parameter Ψ˜
and refer to it as the ‘incumbency advantage term’.
It is worth noticing that while the probabilities are endogenously determined, they do not
depend on the state variable K. The intuition is as follows: an increase in g today implies an
increase in current taxes, which reduces K ′. This results in a loss of ϕS′iK = V
′
SK −W ′SK swing
voters in group S and an increase of ϕN ′iK = W
′
NK−V ′NK swing voters in group N (assuming that
V is steeper than W , the argument also holds if W was steeper). By symmetry, and the fact
that incumbency advantage is additive, ϕS′iK = ϕ
N ′
iK , so the threshold ψ
∗
i (K
′) does not change.
No candidate is able to change policy today and obtain a net gain in the number of votes,
hence they set policy so that the marginal eﬀect of the last unit invested on the probability of
re-election is actually zero. This would not hold if agents had a diﬀerent size or the distribution
of ϕ was region-dependent. An immediate empirical prediction is that the degree of political
turnover should not be aﬀected by the economic conditions of a country.
3.2 Diﬀerentiable Markov-Perfect equilibrium (DMPE)
In order to further characterize the trade-oﬀs faced by an incumbent when choosing investment,
I will assume that policy functions are diﬀerentiable. KKRR made this assumption (in a diﬀerent
context) arguing that there could be in principle an inﬁnitely large number of Markov equilibria.
By assuming diﬀerentiability, the problem delivers a solution that is the limit to the ﬁnite horizon
problem. Moreover, it allows us to derive the government Euler equation (GEE) even if the
envelope theorem does not hold.
The politico-economic equilibrium studied here implies several distortions relative to the ﬁrst
best derived in section 2.2. The incumbent’s ﬁrst order condition with respect to local public
goods spending displayed in eq. 13 can be re-written as an Euler equation and decomposed into
the weighted sum of the wedges described before. This is done in Proposition 1, where primes
denote next period’s variables.
Proposition 1: Deﬁne
ΔHmg = Δg + HgΔk + βΔ′gg′g, where g′g = −Hg H
′
k
H′g
,
ΔHet = (1− λJ)ρ[vg + βg′gv′g],
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ΔDE = (1− p)βρv′gG′kHg, and
ΔIA = (2p − 1)βHgH
′
k
H′g
{ΔHmg′ +ΔHet′}.
Then, incumbent J ’s ﬁrst order condition can be written as a weighted sum of these terms
ΔHmg +ΔHet −ΔDE −ΔIA = 0. (15)
Proof See Appendix 5.
An increase in spending is ﬁnanced by a rise in investment taxes. Because taxes are distor-
tionary, and because parties have no commitment, the governments’ Euler equation involves a
trade-oﬀ between current and future gaps relative to the ﬁrst best. The ﬁrst term, ΔHmg would
be equal to zero in an homogeneous society. The expression up to this point is analogous to
that derived in KKRR, who study a similar environment under a benevolent planner without
commitment and identical agents. The ﬁrst term in ΔHmg is just the gap between the marginal
utility of private consumption and that of public consumption (Δg, deﬁned in section 2.2). Its
second term is the distortion in private investment Δk, weighted by the decrease in aggregate
capital caused by higher taxes. The last term captures tomorrow’s wedge Δ′g weighted by the
indirect eﬀects of current taxes on future spending, where g′g can be interpreted as the change
in g′ that keeps K ′′ unchanged.
The second term in the GEE, ΔHet, incorporates the eﬀect of heterogeneity on the incum-
bent’s policy, abstracting from political instability. A heterogeneous society being ruled by a
dictator belonging to one of the two groups would set g so as to satisfy ΔHmg +ΔHet = 0. The
latter term thus incorporates the distortions arising from the common pool problem: all groups
pay taxes, but only a proportion of them receive the beneﬁts in the form of local public goods.
The term ΔHet = 0 because incumbent J has a weight of 1 on region J while the planner only
paces weight λJ on this group.
The eﬀects of political uncertainty on public spending are apparent in the third term, ΔDE.
When the incumbent is not re-elected, a marginal increase in spending today changes the op-
position’s spending in public goods tomorrow, via the induced decrease in K ′. This reports a
cost in terms of foregone consumption next period with no utility beneﬁt since the incumbent
derives no utility from that public good. Because the current incumbent does not internalize
the full costs of raising taxes when p < 1, it tends to over-spend in public goods. This can also
be interpreted as the current incumbent wanting to ‘tie the hands’ of its successor in order to
restrict its spending. The disagreement over the composition of public goods together with the
political uncertainty promote growth-retarding policies which deter investment, so policymakers
act as being more short-sighted than the groups they represent.19
The last term in the GEE is the incumbency advantage eﬀect, ΔIA. The party in power
knows that not only future spending will be altered when K ′ decreases, but also the future
incumbent’s distortions ΔHmg′+ΔHet′. This term was absent in the previous literature involving
political instability, because most of the papers focused on two-period economies, so there were
no incentives to invest in the last period, Hk(K ′) = 0. Papers that did analyze inﬁnite horizon
economies assumed no persistence (p = 12), which also causes the term to disappear.
20 The
sign of the incumbency advantage term depends on current expectations about the behavior of
future governments and on the degree of political instability.
19This eﬀect is similar to that observed in Persson and Svensson (1989). Besley and Coate (1998) ﬁnd that
disagreements over redistribution policies can result in ineﬃcient levels of investment. Milesi-Ferreti and Spolaore
(1994) also obtain strategic manipulation, but for an alternative environment.
20For two-period economy examples, see Persson and Svensson (1989) or Persson and Tabellini, (2000). For an
inﬁnite horizon economy see Amador (2003).
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Finally, notice that the government’s Euler equation (eq.15) depends on derivatives of an
unknown equilibrium function: Hk(K ′, g′) and Hg(K ′, g′). In such an environment, the tradi-
tional methods to prove existence and uniqueness cannot be used. Most studies have to rely
on numerical methods to characterize equilibrium functions. Even calculating the steady state
level of capital is nontrivial.21
3.3 Qualitative implications in an example economy
Under more speciﬁc assumptions over the production technology and the utility function it is
possible to ﬁnd an analytical solution. In this section, I characterize it and derive qualitative
implications from the theory. Changes in two fundamental parameters capturing socio-political
dimensions will be considered: the degree of polarization ρ and the degree of incumbency ad-
vantage, Ψ˜, which directly aﬀects political instability in our model.
Assumption 1: Suppose that: (i) utility is logarithmic, u(c) = log c and v(g) = log(g +G),
(ii) technology is Cobb-Douglas, F (K,L) = AKαL1−α, (iii) there is full depreciation δ = 1 and
(iv) the cost of public goods is linear: x(g) = g + G when g > 0 and x(0) = 0.
Note that v(0) = log(G) = v¯, so that utility is well deﬁned when no public good is provided
to this region (which occurs every time the group is out of power). The assumption that the
ﬁxed cost of providing public goods is equal to G is a normalization that allows us to ﬁnd closed
form solutions.
Under these assumptions, aggregate investment is proportional to output y = AKα, and
decreasing in spending, H(k, g) = αβy − G − g while consumption is proportional to output,
c = (1 − αβ)y. Because consumption and investment are linear in output, it is reasonable to
guess that public goods spending satisﬁes G(K) = ηy − G, where η is the value that makes
eq.(15) hold. As long as mandatory spending is low enough, the government will be able to
aﬀord the provision of local public goods (i.e. g > 0). A suﬃcient condition for this is that
G < ηAKα0 , where K0 is the initial level of capital (assumed to be below its long run value). The
following proposition shows that this guess is indeed correct in the Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique symmetric MPE that satisifes
T (K) = η
αβ − η , G(K) = ηAK
α −G , and H(K) = (αβ − η)AKα,
where η is given by :
η =
ραβ(1 − αβ)[αβ(2p − 1)− 1]
ρ[αβ(1 + αβ)− 1 + αβp(1− 2αβ)] − αβ(1 + αβ(1− 2p)) . (16)
Proof: Replace the functional forms in Assumption 1, the solution for H(K, g), and the
guess G + G(K) = ηy into eq.(15) and verify that η satisﬁes eq. (16).
In equilibrium, the government taxes investment at a time-invariant rate, which determines
the relative price of investment across countries. A constant share η of GDP is spent on public
goods. This share is known as the size of a government, the main endogenous variable aﬀecting
economic performance in our model.
Remark: The price of investment is larger in countries where the government is large. As
a result, investment rates are lower.
21Krusell and Rios-Rull, (1999) and Azzimonti, Sarte, and Soares, (2009) use linear quadratic approximations
while Azzimonti, de Francisco, and Krusell (2008) use the numerical method discussed in KKRR (2008) to ﬁnd
steady states.
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An agent’s marginal propensity to invest is negatively related to the share of public spending
on output. As the following corollary shows, this slows down growth during the transition and
results in lower levels of output in the steady state.
Corollary 1 The economy converges to a unique steady state where
K¯ = (αβ − η) 11−α , y¯ = AK¯α, c¯ = (1− αβ)y¯ and g¯ +G = ηy¯. The speed of convergence is given
by
γ ≡ ∂K
′
∂K
= (αβ − η)Kα−1,
so countries with similar initial conditions and technology, but a larger government grow at lower
rates towards their steady state. Moreover, they are permanently poorer in the long run. Long
run welfare, conditional on being in power, satisﬁes
V¯ (η) = κ {(1− ρ)[1 + β(1− 2p)] log c¯ + ρ(1− βp) log(g¯ + G) + ρβ(1− p)v¯} ,
where κ = 1−βp
(1−βp)2−(β(1−p))2 , and when out of power
W¯ (η) =
κ
1− βp {(1− ρ)[1 + β(1 − 2p)] log c¯ + ρβ(1 − p) log(g¯ + G) + ρ(1− βp)v¯} .
Given that the share η is the driving force of convergence speed and long run outcomes, it
is interesting to analyze what parameters ultimately determine it. The size of governments is
not only a function of economic variables—the discount factor β and the capital share α—but
also depends on socio-political variables: the degree of polarization in society ρ and the degree
of political instability p. 22
The eﬀects of polarization and instability
In the next two corollaries we focus on the eﬀects of socio-political variables in economic
outcomes, during both the transition and the long run.
Corollary 2: Polarized societies (that share the same level of political stability) have larger
governments, a higher price of investment, lower investment rates, and converge more slowly to
lower levels of GDP than un-polarized societies. Moreover, their long run welfare is smaller.
This can be seen from the fact that private investment, the speed of convergence, and the
steady state value of capital are negatively related to η, since Hη < 0, γη < 0 and K¯η < 0, and
that η is increasing in ρ,
∂η
∂ρ
=
(αβ)2(1− αβ)(1 + αβ(1 − 2p))2
M2
> 0,
where M = ρ[αβ(1+αβ)−1+αβp(1−2αβ)]−αβ(1+αβ(1−2p)). Thus, the model predicts that
the price of investment is positively correlated with polarization, consistently with the evidence
presented in Figure 1 (left panel) and Table 1. Moreover, the sign of the cross derivative is also
consistent with the results in Table 1, since ∂
2η
∂ρ∂p < 0.
The partial eﬀect of political instability on economic variables (assuming ρ is constant) is
summarized in Corollary 3,
Corollary 3: Stable societies (that share the same degree of polarization) have smaller
governments, a lower price of investment, higher investment rates, and converge faster to larger
levels of GDP than unstable societies. Moreover, their long run welfare is larger.
22Actually, the independent variable governing political instability is the incumbency advantage term Ψ˜. Since
there is a one to one relationship between the two, and only p is directly observable in the data, we will phrase
the results in terms of changes in p.
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This results from the negative relationship between η and p,
∂η
∂p
= − 1
M2
(αβρ)2(1− αβ)2 < 0.
This experiment compares two countries with the same level of ρ but a diﬀerent degree of
incumbency advantage, Ψ˜, and hence diﬀerent p. The model predicts a negative correlation
between the price of investment and political stability, consistently with the evidence presented
in Figure 1 (right panel).
The current policymaker foresees that if he loses the next election, the opposition will spend
part of the resources on a public good that reports no utility gains for his constituency. Hence,
the beneﬁts from an extra unit of investment, obtained by keeping the size of government small,
are not fully internalized. This causes the incumbent to behave myopically (that is, more short-
sighted) and over-spend today on unproductive public goods. Investment is then too costly
relative to consumption (since the price of investment is aﬀected by taxation), so agents under-
invest. The eﬀect is stronger the lower the probability of remaining in power. As p → 1 the
economy has no political turnover, so we can think of the planner as a benevolent dictator. A
dictator sets ηD = αβ(1−αβ)ρρ(1−αβ)+αβ > 0.
The dynamic ineﬃciency of governments
It is interesting to note that while the size of governments is smaller under dictatorships
η ≥ ηD, so the economy converges to a steady state with larger output, welfare may not be
larger since one of the groups never receives transfers. How costly this is for society depends on
the stand we take on the welfare function, which ultimately depends on the Pareto weights of
each group. Rather than presuming a particular set of weights, we will characterize the set of
possibilities in the ﬁrst best (the Pareto Frontier, PF) and second best (SB), and compare them
to the combinations of utilities that can be achieved in the political equilibrium.
US
U N
PF
SB
PEN
PES
45o
U
*
U
*
UP
Figure 2: Political distortions and welfare
The Pareto Frontier is given by the pairs [UFBN , U
FB
S ], where U
FB
J denotes the steady state
welfare of group J in the ﬁrst best. Under Assumption 1, and assuming an interior solution for
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both gN and gS , UFBJ is given by
23
UFBJ (λ
J) =
1
1− β
[
log(K¯αFB − ¯KFB + G) + log
(
(1− ρ)1−ρρρ)+ ρ log λJ] ,
where K¯FB = (αβ)
1
1−α is the eﬃcient level of capital in steady state. Figure 2 presents a
graphical representation of PF, where group N ’s weight λN decreases as we move from left
to right in the plot. Even if a group has zero weight, their utility is bounded by v¯ and the
fact that the planner is constrained to give equal consumption to both types. This problem is
thus equivalent to that of a government with access to type-independent lump-sum taxes. The
intersection between PF and the 45o line represents the solution under a utilitarian planner.
Notice that the steady state level of capital is independent of λJ , so regardless of the welfare
function we can immediately see that the PE is Pareto ineﬃcient : capital converges to K¯ =
(αβ − η) 11−α , which is smaller than K¯FB as long as η > 0. The largest value of K in the PE is
achieved when p = 1. Thus while political stability improves welfare, a dictator will not achieve
full eﬃciency.
The Second Best Frontier (SB)
Now, given that we are restricting the set of tax instruments by ruling out lump-sum taxation,
a more useful comparison would be to a benevolent planner (BP). We can compute the set of
steady state welfare pairs that characterize the second best (SB) by solving the problem of a
planner (that puts weights λJ to group J). A BP maximizes equation 3 subject to allocations,
prices, and policy being part of a competitive equilibrium (described in Deﬁnition 1). When the
solutions are interior, steady state welfare of group i is given by 24
USBJ (λ
i) =
1
1− β
[
(1− ρ) log[(1− αβ)K¯αSB ] + ρ log
[
ρ(K¯SB − (αβ)2K¯αSB)
(1− ρ)αβ
]
+ ρ log λJ
]
,
where K¯SB is the steady state level of capital in the second best, that solves K¯SB[αβ(1−ρ)+ρ] =
(αβ)2K¯αSB + αβ(1 − ρ)G. It can be shown that K¯SB is smaller than K¯FB .
Combinations of [USBN , U
SB
S ] (obtained by varying λ
J) trace out the SB frontier. The distance
between FB and SB along any ray from the origin in Figure 2 reﬂects the degree of ineﬃciencies
caused by distortionary taxes. It is interesting to note that in this particular example, the
solution is time consistent, so SB also represents allocations under no commitment.25
Conditional long-run welfare (PEJ)
Now, let us turn to the representation of the political equilibrium in the long run. While
capital converges to a steady state value K¯, utility is stochastic since as parties alternate in
power, the provision of gJ changes. One way to represent the PE is given by the value of welfare
of a particular group, conditional on being in or out of power. Because this depends on p, we
plot the pairs [V¯ J , W¯ J ]—deﬁned in Corollary 1—for all possible values of p ∈ [0, 1]. The line
PEN in Figure 2 represents pairs achieved when group N is the incumbent (analogously with
23There could be corner solutions, depending on the relative weights of each group. When λJ is high,
gJ = 0, gI > 0, UFBJ =
1
1−β
[
(1− ρ) log(K¯αFB − K¯FB) + log(1− ρ)1−ρ + ρv¯ − log(1− ρ + ρλJ)
]
. When λJ is
low gJ > 0, gI = 0, then UFBJ =
1
1−β
[
log(K¯αFB − K¯FB) + log
(
(1− ρ)1−ρρρ)+ ρ log λJ
1−ρ+ρλJ
]
. Finally, for some
parameters it could be the case that gJ = gI = 0, so UFBJ =
1
1−β
[
(1− ρ) log(K¯αFB − K¯FB −G) + ρv¯
]
.
24There could be corner solutions here as well. When gJ = 0, gI > 0, USBJ =
1
1−β [(1−ρ) log[(1−αβ)K¯αSB]+ρv¯]
and when gJ > 0, gI = 0 welfare is deﬁned as in the main text. What changes is the steady state value of capital,
which satisﬁes K¯SB =
(
(αβ)2
(αβ(1−ρ)+ρ)
)1/(1−α)
in both cases.
25This results from the functional form assumptions and it is not true in general.
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PES). As we move from right to left, p increases. Notice that when p = 1 the benevolent
Dictator’s solution coincides with that of a BP that puts no weight on group S. This implies
that if there is no political uncertainty, the PE does not exhibit more distortions relative to the
FB than those arising from distortionary taxation. When p < 1, PEN is strictly below SB
capturing the extra ineﬃciencies caused by political instability (the lower is p, the smaller the
PE set). The political equilibrium then exhibits political failures.
Unconditional long-run welfare
We could also compute ‘unconditional’ expected welfare. Because groups are symmetric,
they will on average be in power half of the time, so U¯PE = 0.5V¯ + 0.5W¯ is an alternative
measure of long run welfare. Notice that as p decreases, steady state capital goes down, so both
V¯ and W¯ decrease. The values of U¯PE are represented by circles in Figure 2, where points
closer to the origin correspond to lower values of p. They are aligned on the 45o line because of
symmetry. As before, when p = 1 we achieve the SB. When p < 1, in addition to the ineﬃciency
created by distortionary taxation, further distortions are introduced by socio-political variables
when the economy lacks a BP. An incumbent in power ignores the welfare eﬀects of policy on
members belonging to the opposition. When choosing spending, the marginal beneﬁt is larger
than that of a BP since all agents pay taxes, while only its own group receives the beneﬁts
(in the form of local public goods). This is a static distortion, with dynamic consequences,
resulting from a common pool problem. The problem becomes more severe the less likely it is
to remain in power. An incumbent who believes that he will be replaced with high probability
does not have strong incentives to abstain from public consumption today in order to reduce
the price of investment (i.e. set lower taxes). Knowing that it is very likely that tomorrow’s
policymaker would prefer a diﬀerent composition of spending, the incumbent tries to manipulate
next period’s policy through the choice of the state variable.
There is yet another source of ineﬃciency in the political equilibrium. The uncertainty over
the identity of tomorrow’s policymaker introduces volatility in the consumption of the public
good that was absent in the BP’s solution. Long run welfare is lower not only because the
amount of resources is smaller, but also because individuals suﬀer from artiﬁcial ﬂuctuations in
the consumption of public goods (keep in mind that there are no productivity shocks in this
economy).
3.4 Quantitatively implications of an example economy
The objective of this section is to provide a robustness check to the correlations found in the
analytical example between the price of investment and our two socio-political variables (polar-
ization and political instability). We assume that the utility of public and private consumption
is CES, u(x) = x
1−σi
1−σi for i = {c, g}, the technology is Cobb-Douglas, f(k, l) = kαl1−α, and there
are no ﬁxed costs of providing public goods, x(g) = g. The parameters in the baseline economy
will be calibrated to the US post-war period, a period corresponding to 4 years (the approximate
time between elections). The capital share is set to 36%, the investment-to-output ratio to 3
and the yearly depreciation rate to 0.08. These imply α = 0.36, β = 0.8847 (or 0.96 yearly),
and δ = 0.22. As standard in the macroeconomics literature, we will set σc = 2 (implying an
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution IES = 0.5). There is less consensus on the value of the
IES of public consumption, 1/σg, but some studies indicate that this elasticity is larger than
that of private consumption, so we will set σg = 0.9. As a benchmark, assume that polarization
is equal to ρ = 0.13 (as in KKRR, and close to the average value of 0.138 in our sample).
The equilibrium is computed using a Perturbation Method, as described in Azzimonti, Sarte
and Soares (2009) or in KKRR. We can see that the negative relationship between the price of
investment and the probability of re-election for the calibrated economy holds, by looking at
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Figure 3.4. The broken line (left-axis) represents the benchmark economy with low polarization,
while the solid line (rigth-axis) is a country twice as polarized as the US. Notice that larger
polarization implies larger distortions, so the negative correlation between these two variables
found in Section 3.3 is robust to the change in parameters.
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Figure 3: Price of investment and political instability.
This model inherits a commonly known sensitivity to σ and δ from the Markov-perfect,
time-consistent solution under distortionary taxation. When δ is very low and σ is high, the tax
rate is actually ineﬃciently smaller than that in commitment case (i.e. than in the second best).
Political instability and polarization exacerbate such ineﬃciency. In this case, the correlation
between these socio-political variables and the tax rate has the opposite sign to the one in the
data. While these cases exist, for standard values of δ and σ the correlations are consistent with
the empirical evidence, as shown in the ﬁgure.
4 Concluding Remarks
I present a model where disagreements about the composition of spending in a polarized and
politically unstable society result in implementation of short-sighted policies by the government.
As a consequence, investment rates are too low, which slows down growth during the transition.
In the long run, this results in output, consumption, and welfare being ineﬃciently low. The
larger the degree of polarization, the greater is the ineﬃciency. Political stability mitigates the
eﬀects of polarization by making the incumbent internalize the dynamic ineﬃciencies introduced
by the choice of growth-retarding policies. The model provides a formal micro-foundation for the
empirical ﬁndings of Easterly and Levine (1997) and Barro (1991) within a dynamic neoclassical
framework with rational agents.
The mechanism driving our results is intuitive. Groups with conﬂicting interests try to gain
power in order to implement their preferred ﬁscal plan. Since there is a chance of being replaced
by the opposition, over-spending is optimal. Because this is ﬁnanced by distortionary taxes on
investment, choosing a large public sector reduces investment: the relative price of investment
goes up as taxes increase, and this deters private savings. The greater the disagreement, captured
by the degree of polarization, the larger the losses of being replaced by the opposition are. Hence,
the stronger is the short-sightedness in policy choices.
The forces that drive short-sightedness are the disagreement of consecutive governments, the
political uncertainty, and the induced lack of commitment. Therefore, a way to improve the
performance of democratic institutions would be to try to reduce the eﬀect of either of these
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factors. Consider for example an independent Congress where both groups had representation.
Depending on each group’s bargaining power, positive amounts of both public goods could be
provided every period, thus reducing the ‘disagreement eﬀect’.
5 Appendix
The FOC with respect to g is:
(1 − ρ)uc[−xg −Hg] + ρvg + βHg
{
pV ′K + (1− p)W ′K
}
= 0, (17)
where primes denote variables evaluated next period and Hg =
∂H(K,g)
∂g . Denote the by G(K)
the function that solves this equation.
We can obtain VK by diﬀerentiating equation (11), and use the eq.(17) to cancel terms
involving changes in G(K). We obtain
VK = (1− ρ)uc[fK + (1− δ) −HK] + βHK{pV ′K + (1− p)W ′K}.
Given the deﬁnition of Δg and using eq.(17) we can write
VK = (1− ρ)uc[fK + 1− δ −HK ]− HK
Hg
[Δg + ρ(1− μ)vg]. (18)
Let H¯K = HK + HgGK . To ﬁnd WK diﬀerentiate eq.(12):
WK = (1− ρ)uc[fK + 1− δ − xgGK − H¯K ] + βH¯K{(1− p)V ′K + pW ′K}, , (19)
We can use eq.(17) to solve for W ′K :
W ′K =
1
1− p
{
(1− ρ)uc[xg + Hg]− ρvg
βHg
− pV ′K
}
. (20)
Replacing this equation into eq.(19), using the deﬁnition of Δg, and simplifying it results in:
WK = (1−ρ)uc[fK+1−δ−xgGK−H¯K]+βH¯k 1− 2p1− p V
′
K+
p
1− p
H¯k
Hg
[(1−ρ)ucHg−Δg−ρ(1−μ)vg].
(21)
Replacing eq. (18) in the expression above and updating one period we obtain an expression for
W ′K that is independent of the value functions and their derivatives. Finally, we can update eq.
(18) one period and replace it, together with W ′K , to obtain the GEE:
Δ˜g + Hg
{
ΔK − βH
′
K
H ′g
Δ˜′g + β
[
−(1− p)ρv′gG′K + (1− 2p)
H¯ ′K
H ′g
(
Δ˜′g +Δ
′
kH
′
g − βH ′g
H¯ ′′K
H ′′g
Δ˜′′g
)]}
,
where Δ˜g = Δg + ρ(1− μ)vg. Re-arranging this expression, we obtain eq.(15).
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